Accountability in Crises and Public Trust in Governing Institutions by Lina Svedin

Author:Lina Svedin [Svedin, Lina]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Public Policy, Leadership, Public Affairs & Administration, Political Science, Political Process, American Government, General
ISBN: 9781136319334
Google: 3ShOdcszmQgC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2012-06-14T06:11:46+00:00

Concluding discussion

When we consider the role that accountability actors play in crises, there are a few factors that we need to keep at the back of our minds that shape the relationship between the actors and the choices these actors make about how to exert accountability.

Consensus

One of the characteristics of Swedish politics historically speaking has been the great value placed on consensus seeking. The traditional Swedish model of corporatism builds upon this idea that by coming together around a table the major actors in the Swedish economy (the government, employers, and unions) could build a strong, economically and socially successful country. One of the ways in which this desire for consensus has expressed itself in parliament has been through a custom of keeping the leadership of the opposition informed about major foreign policy events and the government’s planned actions in this realm.

In crises consensus has arguably played an even greater role. “Sweden is a small country with a tradition of consensus. It is not common for decision-makers to oppose each other at critical moments” (Hansén 1998: 34). Consensus among crisis decision-makers in foreign policy or military confrontation crises has been a way for Sweden to establish credibility with more powerful outside players. The threats to Sweden’s efforts throughout World War II and the Cold War period to stay neutral in conflicts and militarily unallied were seen by politicians as requiring a unified front outward. Examples of this can be seen in Operation Weserübung, the Catalina spy plane affair and the U-137 submarine crisis.

Using consensus as a way to leverage power in other perceived David and Goliath situations where a lot is at stake for Sweden has also been successful. An example of this was seen in the 1992 twin monetary crises. Those involved in managing these crises often referred to the importance of creating trust for the government’s commitment to its policy (much the same way the government had argued about its neutrality policy in the military defense area). The political negotiations with the opposition were a step toward establishing this trust in commitment by the government. The two-level game the government was playing (simultaneously acting toward an international and a domestic audience) was seen as crucial to creating this trust or confidence with the market and ultimately to successfully managing the crisis (Sundelius et al. 1997: 138).

There is, however, also a dark side to this essentially good-natured cultural and psychological group dynamic, as research-excessive concurrence seeking has shown. In some cases Swedish decision-makers have made effective use of the model of consensus in the face of crisis to effectively put accountability mechanisms out of commission. For example, in relation to the 1986 Olof Palme murder stand-in Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson as he “explicitly suggested that members of the parliament should refrain from avoidable conflicts due to the tragic murder. … Subdued by the shock and responsive to the national trauma, the atmosphere in the political debates became friendlier” (Hansén 2003: 79) at the initial stage of the crisis.

Excessive concurrence

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